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Abstract: This article begins by proposing a very partial reading of Lookout Cartridge as a means of 
opening the way to a more comprehensive analysis of Women and Men, an analysis which restricts 
itself, however, to a treatment of the main “man” of the novel, James Mayn, and in particular to 
his relation to his apparently suicidal mother. In doing so, it attempts to conceptualize various 
pastoral themes and intentions that appear in McElroy’s writing, finding thereby a way of 
rendering an account of the author’s anti-paranoid stance with respect to science and technology, 
and enabling certain observations on the viability of an eco-critical approach to literature. The 
main objective, however, is an attempt to understand McElroy’s intention to “transmute” our 
technological fears without merely rejecting them, which involves a fundamental rethinking of 
the Art-Nature, Technè-Phusis conflict at the heart of the pastoral tradition. This rethinking, as it is 
deployed by the text of Women and Men, enables a radical critique, or better deconstruction, if the 
word may still have some pertinence in our world of commodified concepts, of Western power 
and the will to domination and destruction that appears infinitely capable of ignoring itself. What 
McElroy’s pastoral ethos finally amounts to is a respect for the enigma of appearance in its 
difference from nature, an ethos which neither dominant modes of power nor eco-critical 
approaches to its catastrophic effects seem eager to acknowledge. 
 
Résumé : cet article commence par proposer une lecture très partielle de Lookout Cartridge afin 
d’ouvrir un chemin vers une analyse de Women and Men, une analyse qui se borne toutefois à une 
discussion de l’« homme » principal du roman, James Mayn, et tout particulièrement à la relation 
de celui-ci avec sa mère apparemment suicidaire. Ce faisant, certains thèmes et intentions 
pastorales qui apparaissent dans l’œuvre de McElroy sont abordés, dans l’optique de rendre 
quelque compte de l’attitude de l’auteur vis-à-vis de la science et de la technologie modernes, 
lequel permettra par ailleurs quelques observations à propos du bien-fondé des approches éco-
critiques de la littérature. L’objectif principal, cependant, consiste en une tentative de comprendre 
l’intention, tel que la formule McElroy, de « transmuer » nos craintes technologiques au lieu de les 
fuir simplement, intention qui implique la nécessité de repenser de manière fondamentale le 
conflit Art-Nature, Technè-Phusis, qui est au cœur de la tradition pastorale. Cette pensée, telle 
qu’elle se déploie dans le corpus de Women and Men, permet à son tour une critique, ou mieux une 
déconstruction – si ce terme peut malgré tout encore garder une quelconque pertinence pour 
nous aujourd’hui – de la volonté de puissance occidentale et d’une volonté de domination et de 
destruction qui semblent infiniment capable de s’ignorer. Ce en quoi consiste finalement l’éthos 
pastoral de McElroy est un respect pour l’énigme de l’apparence dans sa différence vis-à-vis de la 
nature, un éthos dont ni les formes dominantes du pouvoir ni les approches éco-critiques qui 
tentent de prendre en compte les effets catastrophiques de celles-ci semblent vouloir reconnaître. 
 
Key words: appearance, dissimulation, ghostliness, Lookout Cartridge, Joseph McElroy, paranoia, 
pastoralism, shock, technology, tropology, Women and Men. 
 
Mots clés : apparence, dissimulation, fantomal, Lookout Cartridge, Joseph McElroy, pastoralisme, 
paranoïa, choc, technologie, tropologie, Women and Men. 
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“The Pastoral Ethos of Joseph McElroy’s Mute Philosophy. Lookout 
Cartridge and Women and Men” 
 
What we are lacking is to dare to conceive that existence isn’t in its 
truth unless, between the two limits of an absolute finitude – birth 
and death –, it devotes itself to the uncovering and the expression of 
the idealities, that is, the unreal formalities where how the real is what 
it is comes to appearance. Painting, but also music, and eminently 
poetry, are modes of achieving this task, where the aforementioned 
formalities are themselves enclosed in the movement of the materials 
of Art. Art is mute philosophy. 
                               Gerard Granel (2009 86, my translation) 
 
What is the pastoral convention, then, if not the eternal separation 
between the mind that distinguishes, negates, legislates, and the 
originary simplicity of the natural? […] There is no doubt that the 
pastoral theme is, in fact, the only poetic theme, that it is poetry itself. 
[…] The pastoral problematic […] turns out to be the problematic of 
Being itself. 
                               Paul de Man (1983 239-240) 
   
I know of no better description of what I’m willing to suggest is the task of Joseph McElroy’s 
writing than this definition of Art as mute philosophy offered by Gerard Granel, a French 
philosopher, I should add, whose thought has for reasons which are themselves germane to the 
subject of this paper resisted academic commodification by Anglophone “French Theory.” But 
let me come to this definition later, and begin by clarifying the first phrase of my title, which a 
text by Paul de Man, himself an “allergen” to academia, as J. Hillis Miller has called him (2001), 
alongside work by other literary scholars, will help me elucidate. 
 
It may on first sight appear disingenuous to associate the word “pastoral” with the work of 
McElroy, a postmodern American author whose writings are renowned for their affiliations with 
technology and science. Nothing could be further from McElroy’s sensibility than the flight from 
urban complexity and the naïve idyllicism that is often associated with the pastoral ideal, notably 
in its folkloric and consumerist images. Leo Marx, in his landmark The Machine in the Garden 
(1964), these days read primarily as a proto-ecocritical text, argues however that the pastoral 
tradition in American literature begins not with a sense of harmony with nature, but rather with a 
sudden consciousness of the machine in nature’s midst, and not with the shepherd’s possession 
of an Arcadian realm but with the latter’s felt dispossession of it. Marx posits two kinds of 
pastoralism, a simple and a complex, the first escapist in its idealisation of the simple life in a 
green pasture, the second creative and properly literary in the awareness it displays of technology 
as a “counterforce” to the idyllic vision (Marx 25). A “root conflict” between the machine and 
the garden, technology and nature, underwrites in Marx’s view the creative efforts of writers as 
diverse as Hawthorne, Melville, Thoreau, Twain, Henry Adams and F. Scott Fitzgerald. And the 
shepherd, often of course a poet (or writer) in disguise, does not, at least in America, herd sheep, 
but stands out, Marx insists, as a mediating figure who “seeks a resolution of the conflict between 
the opposed worlds of nature and art.” (22) Rather than harmony, it is ultimately a sense of awe, 
terror, and powerlessness (a theme I shall return to) that these writers display as witnesses of a 
“tragic doubleness” at the heart of the human condition (349). 
 
McElroy’s well-documented but perhaps less well-understood optimism with respect to 
technology appears to set him in stark opposition to Henry Adams, the penultimate witness, in 
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Marx’s book, of this “tragic doubleness.” McElroy distinguishes his work from what he calls the 
“pessimistic tradition” that he sees taking hold in Adams and gaining ascendency in the work of 
contemporaries he admires like William Gaddis, Thomas Pynchon and Robert Coover (1987b 
150-51). The connection he establishes, however, both in interviews and in the body of the novel 
itself, between James Mayn, doubtless the main character of Women and Men and the author of 
The Education of Henry Adams (1987b 153; 1987a 636, 653, 962) points to an identity of interests, if 
not of perspective, between the two authors: one, the modernist visionary of the Dynamo and 
the Virgin as an all-embracing conflict between technological power and sublimated sexual 
vitality, and the other the postmodern novelist of considerably less fatalistic views concerning 
what Adams sees as a Manichean clash between two modes of production. Joseph Tabbi has 
pointed out that what postmodern authors like Gaddis, Pynchon, McElroy and DeLillo have in 
common with Adams is a “self-consciousness” that is “deeply rooted in the materiality of 
contemporary forms of production” (Tabbi 23), and this suggestion is valid and directly pertinent 
to my approach here. What distinguishes McElroy’s work from that of authors like Gaddis and 
Pynchon, however, derives from a fundamentally different conception of the materiality of 
production and from his singular revision of the “root conflict” that Marx situates at the core of 
the American pastoral tradition. What I wish to suggest is that it is precisely the revision of this 
conflict, of “the great Art-Nature antithesis which philosophically is the basis of pastoral 
literature,” as Frank Kermode puts it (37), which enables Mayn to overcome his Adamseque 
world-sickness and nostalgia, in Women and Men, and which, more generally, underwrites 
McElroy’s stance against the pessimistic tradition and the paranoid tendencies that Pynchon, for 
example, has inherited from Adams.  
 
“The possible nightmare of being totally controlled by unseen agencies and powers is never far 
away in contemporary American literature,” Tony Tanner noted in his introduction to City of 
Words (16). McElroy may well have been one of the authors Tanner had in mind when he penned 
his introductory remarks to his survey of American fiction of the ‘60s and early ‘70s, but the 
pastoral ethos that I shall argue is important to a full understanding of McElroy’s stance proceeds 
from an ability to resist this nightmare, not by a stoical streak merely, although an admirable 
steadfastness and an Emersonian (or simply Yankee) breed of optimism are distinguishing traits 
of the author, but by means of formal production. “What I am after,” McElroy writes in an essay 
describing his manner of composition, “is some sequence of contemplation that will use and 
transmute certain sources of our fears without merely rejecting them.” (McElroy 1974b).1 It is of 
course the formal means or the technical ability by which these fears are transmuted that place 
McElroy in a position to chastise, albeit always in a friendly manner, two divergent approaches he 
discerns among his contemporaries: on the one hand, writers whose parodic or satirical stance 
enables them to defend themselves inside their own fictional fabrications against the dread of 
System America, as he claims is the case with John Barth in his “pastoral parody” Giles Goat-Boy 
(1992 31); on the other authors like Norman Mailer, himself parodied in Ancient History, for what 
McElroy sees as an outmoded heroic response to the threat of ego destruction that technology 
poses. Women and Men is inscribed in what McElroy calls a “total ecology” (1992) that can be 
understood neither as a fictional superstructure that defensively abstracts itself from its 
environment nor as a negation of it in a would-be first step in its dialectical recovery.2 The kind 
                                                     
1 “I wanted composition that would not deny the impersonal clarities of modern systems any more than deny what’s 
really touched in Gary Snyder’s ‘Some Things to Be Said for the Iron Age.’ […] I have felt, or hoped, that there may 
be something else in the styles of efficacy which machine and system open to the mind. I am trying to find a way 
which can use unsatirically the very styles of abstraction that are part of processes we are right to fear.” (McElroy 
1974b) 
2 McElroy discusses elsewhere the “closed form of the design” of Barth’s fictions which, as he puts it, “don’t have 
the full risk and force and play they might otherwise have” (McElroy, 1987b 155). See “Holding With Apollo” for 
other remarks on Barth and Mailer and for a succinct introduction to McElroy’s take on modern technology and its 
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of stability or equilibrium, not to say resolution, that McElroy seeks in our postmodern phase of 
the great Art-Nature, or better, Technè-Phusis, conflict, resembles perhaps the surrealist approach 
to this antithesis more than it does that of his contemporaries, if one recalls not only surrealism’s 
probing of the limits between the inside and the outside of the work of art, but the fact that it 
took for its basic ambition the liberation of language from its utilitarian and instrumental 
functions and that it sought in doing so to transform human society. 
 
It is difficult these days to discuss pastoralism without engaging the post-pastoral stance of 
contemporary ecocriticism, and this is all the truer here given McElroy’s own interests in 
environmentalist thinking.3 McElroy’s conception of a total ecology is one which includes what 
post-pastoral (and frequently anti-pastoral) ecocritics persist in calling “nature,” but does not, like 
many of the latter, presuppose a continuous presence understood as the homogeneous ground of 
technical production. Timothy Clark, who has written widely and perceptively on ecocriticism 
and been critical of its realist and often simplistically positivist perspective, notably in the work of 
Laurence Buell, suggests that an “ethical response to nature becomes possible only when we are 
faced with the impossibility of reducing it to the homogenous, the continuous, the perceivable, the 
thematizable” (Clark 21).4 Such an impossibility of reducing nature to a homogeneous ground 
upon which technological, artistic and socio-cultural forms in general can be conceived as 
superstructures also appears central to McElroy’s environmentalist thinking, most explicitly 
perhaps in essayistic writings like “Attractions Around Mount St. Helens” (“But what is 
environment?” he therein asks persistently [McElroy 1996]) and his forthcoming non-fiction 
book devoted to the subject of water, to judge by fragments which have been published so far 
(McElroy 2004, 2010). Rather than being conceived as an underlying principle of continuity, 
nature, in McElroy’s perspective, appears no less textual, in a sense, than the writings dealing with 
it, due in part no doubt to what we nowadays know about the genetic inscription of natural 
organisms, or what Timothy Morton calls “environmental textuality” (Morton, 2010 3),5 but also 
because of his scepticism regarding epistemological claims of the ability to speak on behalf of 
nature.6 McElroy rejects therefore the traditional logic of metaphor, according to which art 
interiorizes and appropriates nature – eats and devours it, as the ecocritics are doubtless right to 
remind us –, and substitutes for it a logic of homologies, transpositions, conversions and 
transfers which situate the inscriptions of natural organisms in a total ecology alongside 
economic, political, cultural, technological, cybernetic and other discourses. This ecology, 
understood therefore not as a pre-established ground of human reality but as a holistic, yet 
discontinuous, series of mediums in which human realities are constituted, might be qualified as a 
“large endless harmony” (287) as the Druid, punningly named Andsworth, puts it in Lookout 
Cartridge, McElroy’s 1974 novel dealing in part with a terrorist organisation’s use of pastoral 
ideology, and in which Stonehenge appears, in an image Leo Marx would have admired, as a 
“Stone Age computer” (346). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
tendency “to erase or revise [my emphasis] the great single and possible Self at the core of our Western tradition” 
(McElroy 1973). 
3 One of the aims of this paper is to provide a response to the ecocritical critique of pastoralism, which is often 
misguided in my view, as will become apparent; but this response is too dependent on other points that need 
development to be offered in exclusion of them, hence what may appear as a rather discontinuous treatment of the 
subject. 
4 I should point out that Clark is quoting Ted Toadvine (2003).
 
5 Morton writes: “We can abandon all variations of Romantic vitalism—believing in a vital spark separate from the 
material organisation of life forms. […] When we zoom into life forms, we discover textuality.” (Morton, 2010 5) 
Despite reservations I have about Morton’s empiricist conception of textuality, this formulation can be considered 
valid, I think, in its assertion of a textual ecology that exceeds human modes of production. McElroy, I believe, 
would agree. 
6“What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.” (McElroy 1992) 
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Lookout Cartridge is a novel in which two ecologies of being are set in violent opposition to each 
other: on the one hand resentment at a perceived loss of individual autonomy in a managed and 
mediated culture fuels the terrorists’ revival of cults (“the trend toward eastern modes, organic 
community, dislodging from city” [McElroy, 1974 70])7 and an interest in ritualized forms of 
experience focused in part on Stonehenge; on the other, a more abstract attempt to surmount 
mediated existence by bringing all things to consciousness, to acquire a comprehensive view, or 
“lookout,” over the plurality of media that determine subjectivity. Far from achieving this higher 
synthesis, however, a form of mediated immediacy that would return transparency to 
consciousness by subsuming the media ecology in which it is grounded, what the latter produces 
is instead delirium from information overload and, much more importantly from a 
phenomenological perspective, intense awareness of the gaps and differences between discourses, 
cinematic and verbal, for instance, to mention the two dominant tropes of the text. From the 
beginning critics have had little difficulty recognizing the phenomenological intentions of the 
novel, even as they have seen these intentions extending themselves in the cartographical project 
of mapping experience from the a priori foundation of medial discourses, a structuralist 
extension, in short, of the Husserlian aim of grounding the self-identity of consciousness on a 
transcendental basis. As suggested above by my doubtlessly partial, but not inaccurate, I think, 
interpretation of the key term “lookout” as a place of medial transcendence, a certain linguistic 
idealism appears, if not to command, at least to inform McElroy’s quest to establish what Tony 
Tanner called an “ultimate topography” of cognitive experience (Tanner 1987). If McElroy 
stopped there, however, we could treat Lookout Cartridge as another benign attempt at a Systems 
Novel and look elsewhere for a model of escape from our technico-historical impasse. But this 
idealism paradoxically proves productive, counter-productive in the infinite closure of the system, 
because the medial discourses, or better perhaps, the eco-technic reality in which the mind’s 
activities are grounded, is revealed as extending consciousness far beyond the confines of any 
“intentional” end, hence as escaping from self-reflexion and sublation within consciousness; 
more simply perhaps, the drive towards totalisation, the point where cognition would become 
total in the mapping of phenomenal experience, transgresses itself, liberating experience of its 
drive for cognitive power. This transgression of cognitive limits is dramatized as the exposure of 
the subjectivity of its main character, William (Mercury) Cartwright, map-maker, indeed, as the 
name suggests, to a “god-like” state of “in-betweenness.” Corresponding with a complete loss of 
cognitive power, the insight that Cartwright attains in these moments of transgression is 
paradoxical, to say the least. What is presented to consciousness is mediation itself, not the thing 
or the reality presented by mediation. It is a mode of insight in which the impossibility of 
perceiving nature or reality as a homogeneous, continuous, thematizable presence is directly 
faced, insofar as it is at all proper to speak of “facing” pure difference. If McElroy doesn’t 
hesitate to dramatize it as god-like, such insight should not be distinguished from ordinary 
experience. Cartwright’s consciousness becomes “god-like,” or, in a less allegorical, Kantian 
philosophical register, transcendental to the extent that it uncovers and, impossibly of course, 
identifies itself with the condition of consciousness, which, as the term “betweenness” suggests, 
turns out to be pure difference.8 Cognitive power is lost in these moments because such insight 
                                                     
7 See Campbell for a discussion of the historical subtext of the terrorist organisation, interpreted as a reaction to 
disillusionment following the failure of ‘60s political movements to effect change in an increasingly technocratic 
society. 
8 Interpretations of Lookout Cartridge as between phenomenology and structuralism have become a critical orthodoxy 
(Tanner [1987], Tabbi, Johnston), yet the “between” is often more an afterthought than the main focus in studies of 
the novel. Although the title of the article may appear to suggest otherwise, John Johnston rightly insists at the end 
of “Narration, Delirium, Machinic Consciousness,” on the “gaps” and the “discontinuities,” and affirms that 
“consciousness must be said to arise or to constitute itself in a difference and as a difference, a difference that 
requires different media of perception and recording for its articulation.” (1998 121) My focus here will be almost 
exclusively on these gaps and discontinuities, and on the ways in which they paradoxically “constitute” Cartwright’s 
way of being in the novel. 
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interrupts, as Cartwright is himself able to observe, subjectivity instead of grounding it. At the 
same time it opens consciousness to what can only be called perhaps a kind of visionary faculty, 
albeit a fundamentally mediated one (“If I am a god, it is precisely because I am not 
independent” [420]), that divines rather than perceives reality, intuits its place in the medial 
ecology, whence the strange sort of epistemological liberty of the vividly detailed descriptions of 
the “field” in which Cartwright’s mind is felt to move (“My mind played in the field of someone 
else’s inventing, more than one someone, I thought.” [359]). The effect, which is difficult to 
present without quoting large extracts of the text, is something like what Henry James manages 
to convey in “The Turn of the Screw” when the governess’s vision is suspended by specular 
presentations of linguistic mediation, resulting in the retreat of presumably stable ontological 
notions like life, reality, nature, experience, but in a way which is devoid, of course, of the governess’s 
reactionary hysteria and which extends itself farther into an eco-technical reality that James’s own 
media-savvy consciousness could only have predicted (see “In the Cage”). The perceived 
interruption of the referential myth of correspondence between representation and reality, that 
myth which underwrites, for example, the novel’s terrorists’ discourse – and appears to inform 
the contemporary ecocritic’s militant “referential sickness,” as Tom Cohen puts it in his de 
Manian commentary on the “eco-catastrophic imaginary of today” (Cohen 116, 114),9 – becomes, in 
the cool-headed exaltation of Cartwright’s sublime visions, a liberating suspension of the 
experiential fallacies that underwrite cognitive power and its authority.10 
 
I shall return to Cartwright’s “god-like” insight in a moment, but let me first point out that such 
defusing of the cognitive authority of mass-mediated consciousness is one effect of McElroy’s 
writing to which we might attribute certain “curative powers,” to borrow Kathryn Kramer’s 
expression (Kramer 80). Kramer, however, is speaking of the way McElroy’s texts have of 
restoring a sense of the human to experience which is progressively exposed to the inhuman 
materiality of technological mediation. The pastoral ethos that I identify with McElroy’s anti-
apocalyptic, anti-paranoid stance is not a humanizing consolation for technical deracination, but 
rather its tropological definition as a form of literary experience. Such a definition would appear 
not to exclude the humanistic interpretation that Kramer offers, since the pastoral is by 
definition, it seems, an anthropomorphising trope. But, as trope, the pastoral is also capable of 
recognizing itself as such, in a self-reflexive turn that undoes its own organicist fallacy. One need 
only read Hind’s Kidnap. A Pastoral on Familiar Airs, which the author insists is not a satire, to see 
that McElroy is abundantly, if not unreservedly, aware of the generative and proliferating power 
of the trope to produce meaning far beyond any possible reduction to its organicist premises. 
The (dis-)organizing principle of that novel can be said to be the very separation between 
consciousness and nature that Paul de Man, in his comments on William Empson’s Some Versions 
of the Pastoral, from which I quoted at the beginning of this paper, emphatically declared to be 
inherent to the pastoral convention: “What is the pastoral convention,” we read, “if not the 
eternal separation between the mind that distinguishes, negates, legislates, and the originary 
simplicity of the natural?” By “eternal” separation, de Man of course means absolute, irreducible, 
which perhaps explains why the pastoral convention cannot even be restricted to specific modes 
or genres of poetic writing, for there is “no doubt,” he writes, “that the pastoral theme is, in fact, 
the only poetic theme, that it is poetry itself.” Such a generalization of the mode’s significance 
(which McElroy, I think, also recognizes in his manner) is perhaps inevitable to the extent that 
one understands what Kermode called the philosophical antithesis at the basis of pastoral 
                                                     
9 On the anti-theoretical turn in ecocriticism, see, besides Cohen, Phillips, Clark, and Morton (2007). 
10 See Joseph Tabbi’s discussion of “sublime referentiality” in his reading of Plus (Tabbi 143). Defining his notion of 
the sublime in a way that could also be applied to Lookout Cartridge, he writes: “The construction of a self-image that 
is at once outside and inside consciousness – and finally incapable of representing itself to itself – is […] 
characteristic of the paradoxical structure of the sublime.” (151) It is of course this state of betweenness, inside and 
outside consciousness in Tabbi’s formulation, which determines the primary signification of “lookout” in the novel 
(“right now I felt between. Like a lookout” [McElroy, 1974 174]).  
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literature in a truly ontological manner, as de Man does: “the pastoral problematic” – which 
Empson discerns as the disguised or secret basis of Marxist thought (Karl’s not Leo’s) in the 
chapter of Some Versions of the Pastoral that de Man is commenting on – “turns out to be the 
problematic of Being itself” as it “is lived by any genuine thought.” 
 
De Man is insisting here, despite the allusion to “any genuine thought,” on the fundamental 
disposition of literary thought, that expressed most notably in the pastoral tradition, to resist 
cognitive relapse into the fallacy of a possible reconciliation with nature. To resist falling into a 
certain referential sickness, as Cohen emphasizes, which must of course be the condition of any 
responsible eco-critical or environmentalist thinking. The eco-catastrophic imaginary – as a 
paranoid reaction to technical deracination and a supposed loss of “natural” environment11 – is 
perhaps one of the first symptoms we must treat if we are to have any hope of saving life on 
earth. It is at any rate precisely this disposition, this stance or this ethos, of resistance to falling for 
the naturalisation of reference (the word is important, we shall see, in Women and Men), which 
turns out to have a “curative” or “homeopathic” effect in McElroy’s writing. But let us simply 
retain for the moment this possibility of a healthy, “patient” pastoralism, a pastoralism that is 
more capable of resisting “falling into the traps of impatient ‘pastoral’ thought” (de Man, 1983 
241) than the social (Marxist in Empson’s chapter on proletarian literature that de Man is 
discussing in the late ‘70s) or meta-social (think eco-critical) forms of thought which have 
depended on it for their own emergence and development.12 For better than any ideological 
pastoralism (the kind de Man refers to between quotation marks) that aspires to the overcoming 
of the alienation of self and the renewal of man’s relationship to nature, pastoral convention 
knows that “the gap that cleaves Being” (de Man, 1983 245) is the very possibility of sentient 
experience.13 
 
Dissimulation 
 
A brief example from Lookout Cartridge can suffice to show how McElroy’s pastoral ethos 
originates not as a counter to our techno-scientific alienation and destruction of nature, as in the 
ecocritical perspective, but, more fundamentally, as a response to its ontological retreat. In a 
moment of reverie, Cartwright alludes in a curiously duplicitous manner to a sense of intimacy 
with nature that he shared one day with a friend: “an illusion of April intimacy that I now see has 
also intimacy’s authentic shiver, at least for me who was between.” (382) The temporal difference 
that is evident here between the sense of “illusion” and that of intimacy’s “authentic shiver” 
attenuates what is often, in McElroy’s fiction, a more direct, more shocking revelation of what we 
might call, after Blanchot in his revisionary reading of Heidegger, the “dissimulation” of being. 
What is exposed here, and yet sheltered at the same time, by its temporalisation, is the gap that 
cleaves being, as de Man puts it, and which no human agency can claim responsibility for; nor, of 
                                                     
11 Timothy Morton qualifies the kind of referential sickness he sees in eco-criticism as “ecomimetic” (Morton 2007), 
a trope suggesting sameness between representation and the thing represented and which refuses, of course, to 
account for difference. Tom Cohen, in the article referred to above, reads Morton’s critical diagnosis of ecomimetic 
sickness as de Manian, pointing out that de Man’s writings themselves appear curiously exiled from it, however, 
which is itself, he argues, a symptom of how radically intolerant we have become to what de Man’s writings have to 
teach us about our current conditions. 
12 For a succinct overview of ecocriticism’s emergence from the pastoral tradition see Gifford (2017).  
13 Given the ontological definition of pastoral offered by de Man and, somewhat less emphatically, by such 
prominent specialists of the mode as Empson and Kermode, I shall not attempt to formulate a notion of “post-
pastoral,” as many critics have done with respect to what convention dictates I nonetheless call postmodern writing. 
The historicisation of the term seems to me to be of limited pertinence, at least for my purposes here, although it is 
not without interest in various attempts that are currently underway to critically identify and explain the persistence 
of pastoral intentions and themes in 20th and 21st century writing. An interesting overview of such attempts can be 
found in the closing chapter of Frank Gifford’s Pastoral, and in Joshua Corey’s “A Long Foreground: Exploring the 
Postmodern Pastoral.” 
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course, be blamed for. An illusion appears here as authenticity appears – albeit with the important 
temporal difference I’ve indicated, diminishing the force, but not the value, of the revelation –, 
interrupting what we normally mean by cognition, in this case precisely the cognition of nature. 
Nature recedes in its very presentation, or presents itself as a receding of presence. If such 
revelations are “intimations of immortality,” as McElroy suggests (437-438), echoing 
Wordsworth’s poem on that subject, it is because such revelations interrupt temporal experience, 
expose consciousness to its transcendence, to a gap or a difference which is the very possibility of 
temporal experience. Temporal experience supposes a spacing or spacing-out of the antithetical 
notions (from a cognitive perspective) of “illusion” and “authenticity,” appearance and presence. 
In other words, it is time itself that veils, in a certain manner, the dissimulation proper to being, 
which the narrative act in McElroy attempts to recover. Our chronological conception of time, 
which the traditional realist novel reinforces in its narrative form, itself veils a more authentic 
notion of time as the temporalization of the dissimulation proper to being. The plethora of media 
technologies that McElroy employs in his fiction, from film cartridges to computer discs and so 
on does not alter in any fundamental way being’s “own” dissimulation, but veils the experience of 
it, even as, in a certain manner, it democratizes it, carrying it over from the Wordsworthian, rural 
sublime into the modern sphere of urban experience. Conceived, in Janus-like manner, both as a 
barrier to the disclosure of dissimulation as an ontological principle and as its historical repetition 
in the modern world, the veil of technology determines both the ideological blindness and 
reactionary violence of the terrorists in Lookout Cartridge and the negative, pastoral insight of its 
main character. Only the latter, of course, is productive of narrative and of the kind of radically 
de-instrumentalized and de-aestheticized language which comprises McElroy’s fiction, which, 
while transgressing the public codes of syntax and semantics, resists the reduction of language to 
a merely sensuous medium in a vain attempt to compensate for a loss of natural plenitude. 
Indeed, the shock that the revelation of dissimulation provokes in consciousness, or, on a slightly 
different level of its apprehension, the shock that the revelation of mediation entails for self-
consciousness, is nothing less than the coup d’envoi of narrative process in McElroy. An example 
of such a shock and its irruption as the originating instance of narrative (and lived experience) is 
offered by Dagger, a friend of Cartwright, when he tells the story, which he likes to repeat, 
“about his uncle Stan in Yonkers who got one of the old wire recorders before the war and when 
he heard his voice on it he got a whole other idea of himself, grew a moustache, and left his wife 
and went to live in New Jersey where he became a phone salesman for encyclopaedias.” (97) 
Medial shocks like this one interrupt, or cut across, subjectivity conceived as a structure of 
possible self-return, and trigger otherwise unlikely and altogether unexpected series of events. 
McElroy’s fiction itself appears to spring from the shocks that the short-circuiting of normal 
mediating process triggers, where the mind captures momentarily its transcendence, its ecstatic 
exposure and “god-like” liberty from cognitive (and linguistic) order and authority. 
 
The ruptures that medial shocks like this provide, and which are disseminated throughout 
McElroy’s fiction, are in fact generalized, eco-technical instances of what J. Hillis Miller has called 
the “linguistic moment” of literary creation, that moment when “the relation of poetic language 
to something outside language represented by language is broken in the transport of the caesura.” 
(Miller, 1987 41)14 As a polymath of considerable eco-technical awareness, McElroy is able to 
                                                     
14 What Miller calls the linguistic moment has of course been studied by other critics and theoreticians of literature in 
the wake of the post-phenomenological “linguistic turn” that occurred in literary studies in the United States in the 
1970s, a turn which has since degenerated unfortunately into various historicisms, culturalisms and, more recently, 
ecocriticisms, which tend in their compulsion to humanize and naturalize reference to resist what is misguidedly 
regarded as the mere “textualism” of deconstructive approaches to literature (see Buell, for example, in his 
misleading and caricatured rendering of modern critical theory and what he calls the unfortunate “divergence 
between commonsensical and specialized wisdom” with respect to literary representation [83-88]). As I’ve already 
suggested, the main “allergen” in the late 20th and early 21st century academic retreat from theory has been Paul de 
Man, for whom the turn in question is interpreted as “allegorical” in his Allegories of Reading. No less important from 
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apply the negative, poetic insight of the caesura to discourses often considered alien to literature, 
like environmental science, cybernetics or information theory, for instance, since the materiality 
of these media necessarily entails the same irreducible opacity that literary authors have 
recognized in poetic discourse. McElroy situates himself thereby as a kind of middle-man, a 
mediating figure between these discourses, which partly explains no doubt why critics like 
Kathryn Kramer, alluded to above, find that his writings have a “homeopathic” effect. The 
critical approaches to McElroy’s texts which are based on cybernetics or information theory, 
however limited they are due to their emphasis on these systems themselves as analogies or as 
collaborative discourses, instead of on the gaps between them, are themselves testimony of the 
dissemination of a “moment” which one would be mistaken to reduce to a purely linguistic 
origin, since it depends on the materiality of logical formalities inherent to the media ecology in 
general.15 But language is clearly the basis of this insight which enables McElroy to find vitality in 
technical processes that subvert the organic conception of human life as an immediate or 
unmediated principle. 
 
It is an insight that Henry Adams seemingly lacked, and which underwrites McElroy’s persistent 
return to pastoral themes as a way of retrieving, in a certain manner, the Art-Nature, or Technè-
Phusis, difference. A thorough analysis of such themes would have to include a discussion of 
Hind’s Kidnap. A Pastoral on Familiar Airs (1969) the author’s “city-pastoral” as he calls it (McElroy 
1974b), whose main character is a shepherd in a linguistic field of proliferating signs, and whose 
quest to retrieve a kidnapped child turns out to be the impossible pursuit of a man in search of 
his own abducted innocence; the city/country opposition that helps structure Ancient History. A 
Paraphase (1971); the meditation on the word “green” in Plus (1977),16 McElroy’s “extra-terrestrial 
pastoral,” as one might call it, which enacts the gradual retrieval – on the part of a disembodied 
brain orbiting the planet in outer-space – of the memory of a man whole and on a beach, in love 
back on earth, a novel wherein a truly radical separation from nature turns out to be the 
condition of its fragmentary recovery in the memory of the linguistically re-embodied brain; the 
terrorist pastoralism and its counterforce in Lookout Cartridge, to which I have alluded; the 
pastoral education that James Mayn will have received from his maternal grandmother Margaret 
in Women and Men, itself mediated by her reading of Cooper and Emerson, and above all by her 
intimate knowledge of the West and of the Navajo past out of which she weaves the fabulous 
tales whose recollection will help enable her grandson to recover from childhood trauma and to 
overcome a particularly inhibitive form of technological paranoia (part of her own formation 
even involves an 1893 visit to the World’s Fair in Chicago similar to the one Adams writes about 
in “The Dynamo and the Virgin”); not to mention the author’s environmentally minded essays, 
the fragments of the water book, and if possible the still awaited book on grain that was 
conceived, the author tells us, as a late 1980s version of Walden (1987b 159). These are but some 
examples of the pastoral themes and intentions that emerge in McElroy’s work. Frederick Karl 
has said that “there is in McElroy some of that nostalgia for an America which was, once, 
Edenic, or thought to be; the New Zion, the new earthly Paradise,” and insisted on the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
my own perspective, regarding notably what Miller calls the “caesura,” is Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading of 
Hölderlin, notably in “The Caesura of the Speculative.” Perhaps closest however to my own approach here, in its 
borrowing from Granel’s post-heideggerien assessment of language, is Christopher Fynsk’s Language and Relation … 
that there is language, where some of Heidegger’s insights into language are filtered through readings of Blanchot, 
Benjamin, Celan and Irigaray. Finally, on the word “eco-technical,” see Miller (2012). 
15 See Yves Abrioux (2001) who, in seeking to correct “the excessive abstraction of the cybernetic approach” to his 
work, offers what are to this date probably the most detailed and insightful analyses of the formal structure of 
McElroy’s fiction by developing the figure of the “vectoral muscle” that appears in Hind’s Kidnap and that the 
novelist discusses in “Neuronal Neighborhoods.” See notably, at the end of the article, his discussion of the interplay 
between affect and percept in his close reading of fragments from the opening chapter of Women and Men, offered as 
a “prolegomenon” to a more extensive reading of the novel. 
16 See Pamela White Hadas’s “Green Thoughts on Being in Charge.” 
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“extremely difficult quest for retrieval” that this nostalgia entails (Karl 193).17 This is doubtless 
true, and one would be well advised not to underestimate the affective force of a nostalgia which 
perhaps only the best or the most disciplined writers of the pastoral tradition have been able to 
counter. For it is not merely the postmodern generalisation of the conflicts and tensions inherent 
to pastoral writing, their application to global culture and mass technological production, which 
makes McElroy worth reading today. What makes him pertinent for us is above all the depth of 
his revision of the pastoral ethos, the disclosing (or retrieval) of a mode of formal production 
which, as we must now attempt to identify more precisely, enables critical resistance to the 
techno-scientific and capitalist modes of production which are responsible for contemporary 
threats like global terrorism, financial meltdown and anthropogenic climate change (and the eco-
catastrophic responses to the latter). This singular and finite mode of production, grounded in 
literary awareness or knowledge but not limited to it, is knotted with – not to say grounded in – 
an affective force or drive, inherent to the pastoral tradition, which doubtless originates in an 
inconsolable sense of loss. If, in affective terms, the pastoral drive finds its origin in a wound, a 
violation, a loss seemingly too outrageous for consciousness to endure – one need only think of 
Imp Plus’s traumatic separation from the green earth – then it follows, as McElroy has said in an 
interview, that all his novels are “psycho-philosophical mystery stories about the self putting itself 
back together again.” (LeClair 78). Attempting to uncover the means or the ability by which 
McElroy “transmutes” our technological fears will ultimately necessitate an approach to the 
shock or trauma which is to affective life what the gap that cleaves being is to the world in its 
structure of dissimulation. 
 
The World as Appearance 
 
This assertion that the world, not in some abstract objectivity, like the supposed “object” of 
science, but in its appearance, possesses the structure of dissimulation as the ontological principle 
elucidated above can be verified by examining more closely a few of the “God Mercury 
Cartwright”’s (352) statements about being. Let me begin by recalling an instant the example of 
nature’s dissimulation discussed above: “an illusion of April intimacy that I now see has also 
intimacy’s authentic shiver, at least for me who was between.” What is essential here, to put it 
now in slightly different terms, is the awareness of an irreducible figurality in the revelation of 
nature, the awareness of an irreducible mimesis in alètheia. Far from being of peripheral 
significance in the novel, as the quotation of such a fragment might suggest, this awareness is 
central to Cartwright’s way of being and is expounded by him in various ways, most notably 
through his use of a certain Hindu concept employed by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and 
Representation and by Nietzsche in the early chapters of The Birth of Tragedy, according to which 
there is an irreducible Mãyã in the presentation of what us moderns call truth. That is what it 
means for “authenticity” and “illusion” to be one. Cartwright puts it this way, to his wife Lorna, 
in Lookout Cartridge: 
 
I told Lorna that in Hindu thought Mãyã has opposing qualities. It is a force of illusion, and illusion 
is inferior to truth, and truth lies beyond the senses. But Mãyã is also a force of illusion that helps 
us to believe in this same world the senses give us, and this makes Mãyã a force powerful, even 
good. (204) 
 
For Cartwright world is appearance, the product of a “force of illusion” which is inferior to truth 
but makes truth accessible. Mãyã, like the Greek mimèsis (a term which McElroy, like 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche before him, does not use perhaps because of its reductive 
interpretation as “imitation”), opens up the eidetic in the sense that it makes appearance 
                                                     
17 Tom LeClair has also discussed McElroy’s quest for retrieval and his “urge to master the relations between 
America before the Age of Information and life in the present.” (LeClair, 1990 260) 
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believable, and installs a world which the senses give but fail, of course, to apprehend. This is a 
theoretical way of saying what any reader of McElroy’s text already knows, perhaps, in short that 
the sensuous cognition of objects – a comb, a bar of soap, a glove reaching into a laboratory 
container, to borrow almost at random a few prominent images from the text – is never an 
immediate perception but always already determined eidetically. As a force of illusion, or mimetic 
faculty, Mãyã provides the formal structure of appearance without which things themselves 
would not appear. But it is less things themselves, or even the world itself installed or presented 
in this manner, that interests Cartwright, than the process of installation or of presentation itself, 
in other words what McElroy, in an important essay, calls the “untouchable processes beneath 
appearance” (1974b). As a mercurial figure, Cartwright’s place is “irredeemably between” (358), 
as he puts it, never amidst things or amidst reality in its presented appearance, but rather at the 
“gap” between illusion and truth where things appear as such, where presentation or appearance 
occurs. “I am Mãyã,” he declares (388). Hermes-figure, mediator par excellence, middle-man, or 
Da-sein in person, we might say, evoking Heidegger, Cartwright is there where being presents 
itself, that is, at the place of its dissimulation, and bears the hyperbolical responsibility in the 
novel of making the world believable, not as an objective reality – the background against which 
events occur in a traditional realist novel – but in its constant coming-into-being as appearance. 
 
Mãyã, therefore, as a certain mimetic technique, or technè, is productive, not merely imitative. 
When we read, for instance, at one point in the novel: “Between this and what happened next, I 
knew myself to be adequate” (389), what we are confronted with is precisely the hyperbolical 
responsibility to be there – being’s shepherd, Heidegger, a pastoralist after all in his manner, would 
say –, to be present there where there is no presence, ecstatically exposed to the void of a 
difference, to transcendence, that is, once again, to the essential finitude which is the condition of 
temporal experience. To be productive in this sense, that is, to be Mãyã, is to be possessed of, or 
rather by, a “god-like” power that dispossesses the personal self of all volition, which is why the 
“visionary” faculty alluded to above is an impersonal one (“I lacked a core of personal vision” 
[407]). 
 
The drama of McElroy’s fiction, which critics have often discerned to be phenomenological in 
nature, is in appearance itself. Rather than presenting events in the world, its task is to present the 
world as appearance. As Cartwright explains to his friend Kate: “Mãyã means the world is not 
separate from me.” (370) This is not a solipsistic assertion. What is thematised here is a 
fundamental shift from the traditional understanding of the separation of the object from the 
subject, that metaphysical mode of difference which both determines and is radicalized by 
modern science, to a manner of being-in-the-world wherein the world itself appears as an 
attribute of the “god-like” Cartwright. As our reading advances we shall have to find less 
allegorical means of describing this manner of being. For the moment, what is important to 
recognize is that for Cartwright world and appearance, being and appearance, are one, and this 
appearance, or phenomenon, if one prefers (since appearance does not present itself as 
appearance merely but as reality), requires the “betweenness” of a finite being which exists, in the 
strictest sense of the term, by virtue of its participation in the medial ecology of what one might 
call Being itself. This awareness of existence is what determines the apparently hyperbolical 
responsibility, from Cartwright’s perspective, of eidetic production: “so that the world comes to 
be believed in, between us and the truth” (388). In other words, so that “truth” remains a 
possibility for us. Truth is not the unveiling of presence, as in the metaphysical perspective, but 
the unveiling of the world in its appearance, that is in its irreducible figurality, which only the 
finite tasks of the mimetically astute middle-man, so to speak, the man of difference – not the 
industrious and self-possessed entrepreneur, whose productivity eludes him in the infinite 
production of the techno-scientific capitalist complex – can engender. 
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Cartwright’s ethos, then, his way of being, and above all perhaps his extraordinary sense of 
responsibility,18 place him between “art” and “nature” in a way that resembles the conflict of the 
pastoral hero as it is described by Leo Marx, but alters the terms of this conflict considerably, 
precisely to the extent that the humanist perspective of The Machine in the Garden is determined by 
the metaphysical opposition of subject-object. It is necessary therefore, if we are to comprehend 
this ethos as something other than merely a postmodern version of Marx’s pastoralism, to adjust 
our approach to the conflict, understanding Cartwright’s manner of being as closer to 
Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world” than to modern humanist interpretations of being as 
a subjective core of individuality, spirit or consciousness, in an objective world.19 Harry Mathews, 
in his reading of Women and Men, the novel to which I shall turn in a moment, says that there is an 
essential “giving up of whatness” in McElroy’s writing (Mathews 221), which is another way of 
observing that the central task of the writer is not to imitate reality but to show, as we’ve just 
seen, how reality comes to be believed in. Mercury, of course, is a figure of the writer, and an 
underworld figure at that. As a god, he is in the world but not of it. How is one to grasp this 
difference, this betweenness, and its significance for the writer? Understanding this difference in 
non-metaphysical terms requires a basic rethinking of language, in short of the difference 
between our utilitarian and instrumentalist conception of language – proper to the “subject” who 
has fallen from Mãyã, from betweenness, from finitude, into the degraded conception of reality 
that modern techno-scientific and capitalist modes of production depend on and hold in their 
grips – and language in its eidetic function, that is, as a productive force responsible for the 
coming-into-being of what we call reality. I began this paper with a quotation from Gerard 
Granel which suggests that such giving up of “whatness” in turning to the “howness” of being 
involves, as he puts it, “the uncovering and the expression of the idealities, that is, the unreal 
formalities, where how the real is what it is comes to appearance.” These “idealities” – found 
nowhere in nature – which enable nature to appear, or these “unreal formalities” – found 
nowhere in reality – which enable reality to appear, are uncovered pre-eminently in language (in 
what Paul de Man, who was not a philosopher but a reader of literary texts, teaches us to see in 
the rhetorical properties of language). Therein lies the essential difference, the essential 
betweenness, that Cartwright’s manner of being asks us to comprehend. His betweenness can be 
considered as a kind of recovery from the oppressive lure of the subject-object relation, which is 
really no relation at all, according to McElroy, in the form of awakening to an uncanny awareness 
of the eidetic formalities – found nowhere in things – which enable things themselves to appear. 
If, borrowing Granel’s definition of Art, McElroy’s fiction can therefore be considered as a 
“mute philosophy,” it is not of course because it would consist of some kind of application or 
dramatization of a pre-baked philosophy,20 but because it is a latent expression of what the 
novelist calls those “untouchable processes beneath appearance,” a formal, not thematic, attempt 
to uncover the conditions of reality. As we shall see, the so-called muteness of this art is also its 
force. It uncovers not descriptively, but in a performative manner. 
 
Minding the Gap 
 
                                                     
18 An apparently hyperbolical sense of responsibility for the world is typical of McElroy’s characters, all Holden 
Caulfields in their manner. Tony Tanner discusses this will “to ‘protect,’ be a ‘saviour,’ support and ‘shepherd’ 
others, be a moving watchman in the city […], a guardian,” as a “protofamilial stance […] vis-à-vis the world” in his 
essay on McElroy (1987 215). 
19 See William S. Wilson’s discussion of the importance of the notion of “field” in McElroy’s writing; he writes: “the 
hero is intelligible as a region of a field, not as a sphere or core of individuality which passes through a field in 
fulfilment of a destiny.” (Wilson 2012). Wilson’s conception of being “fielded” seems not incompatible with the 
Heidegerrian notion of “being-in-the-world.” 
20 McElroy discusses the difference between fiction as a merely “dramatized” philosophy and the “physical thought” 
of writers he admires like James, Nabokov and Bernhard, where he claims the “working spirit” of the philosopher is 
evident, in “Socrates on the Beach: Thought and Thing” (McElroy, 2002 9). 
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Nietzsche’s final insight may well concern rhetoric itself, the discovery 
that what is called “rhetoric” is precisely the gap that becomes apparent 
in the pedagogical and philosophical history of the term. 
                                          Paul de Man (1979 131) 
 
“Cover” is an important word in Women and Men, where it is used precisely to describe what 
cognition does (see notably the chapter entitled “IN FUTURE”). James (or Jim) Mayn, I’ve said, 
is the principle character of the novel, and given what I’ve related above about Cartwright (“I am 
Mãyã”), it will be unnecessary to dwell at length on the suggestiveness of that name. The name is 
also curiously duplicitous, however, since, if his father’s name is Mayn, his mother’s, before 
marriage – an important theme in Women and Men – was Mayne. Sexual difference therefore is a 
silent, graphically inscribed difference, suppressed (or covered) in speech. It returns, however, in 
the writing of Women and Men – or in what, beyond the oppressive and repressive discourse of 
speech, McElroy has called “language’s ability to express itself” (1987b 145) –, and it is partly this 
return which, at the thematic level, delivers Mayn from his Henry Adamsesque paranoia 
regarding technological production.21 “Hypothetical Man” (McElroy, 1987a 337),22 “ad hoc 
Man,” “Recycled Man” (236), James, “that Mayn of many turns” (596), is a journeyman reporter 
who makes his living on information. He is by turns a climate change expert, a specialist of South 
American political economies, a dabbler in geothermal physics and astrophysics, among other 
things. He remains throughout, however, “ordinary” Mayn (411), a postmodern “Man Without 
Qualities,” McElroy has elsewhere suggested (1987b 157). He is also “Divorced Man” (260), but 
in memory at least he is usually only separated from his wife, as part of the novel is devoted to 
his working towards what some might consider the paradoxical successfulness of their 
separation. He has a girlfriend, no less interdisciplinary than he, who reads “anthro-historico-
botanico-technologico-linguistico tomes” (234), and who also has a role to play in his recovery, as 
does a woman named Mayga (resembling Mayn in her “Mãyãn” or mimetic faculties) who is 
adept at telling things “slant.” “Political terrorism” (overflowing from Pinochet’s fascist regime) 
with “its quiet linguistic routine” (579), which I understand as a smothering of Mãyã (Mayga is in 
fact assassinated it appears by one of Pinochet’s hitmen) and the reduction of language to its 
instrumental and violently utilitarian functions, is again the distorted mirror of the protagonist’s 
uncanny resistance to power and the authority of the System. 
 
Call him a typical shepherd-writer of little pretence to an identity of his own (“white, male, 
middle-aged, lapsed agnostic, middle-class routinely-married-then-sleazily-single newsman-oid” 
[668]). He is always “in two places at once” (242, 538, 1052), for example the two households he 
was raised in, his mother’s and his grandmother’s, or else rural New Mexico and urban New 
York, but, more importantly, Mayn oscillates in mind between the small New Jersey town he 
grew up in – its “green streets” (861), among other things, recalling the generic pastoral space 
between wilderness and city – and a technological future of daunting inhibitive force which in 
paranoid fashion he strangely intuits he already resides, or has come from, having been projected 
there, he discerns, as an effect of the traumatic event of his mother’s suicide, which occurred 
when he was fourteen years old. More daunting than Adams’s Dynamo, the technological future 
Mayn imagines is one where heterosexual couples are sent to colonize stations in outer-space, 
called “L5 libration settlements” (666), where their sexual identities are fused into one. 
 
                                                     
21 In truth, McElroy’s narrator (if one can speak of one) appears to see paranoia already in Thoreau: “so Eco can be 
transformed into Physics in another space or in another space translated into English where another maniac wielding 
a borrowed axe by Walden Pond can huff and puff, ‘But lo, men have become the tools of their tools’” (McElroy 
1987a 302-03). 
22 All further page numbers given without reference to the work are from Women and Men. 
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If Mayn, in his manner, is ultimately no less a mercurial figure, a middle-man or man of 
difference, than Cartwright, his (re-)awakening23 as such depends on his working back towards 
the traumatic event at the origin of this paranoid projection of himself, an event which remains 
beyond the reach of cognition, and constituting a gap in knowledge that the “subject,” of course, 
cannot grasp: “probably he was in shock from his mother’s suicide though why didn’t he feel 
so?” (843) Such a shock, I’ve already suggested, is the affective equivalent of the ontological shift 
or transfer that McElroy seeks incessantly to recover in his writing, and which is most succinctly 
thematized perhaps in Hind’s Kidnap, where it is figured as a bewildering abduction of a child: 
“how like our own life is this event!” exclaims the awe-stricken shepherd of that novel to his 
estranged wife Sylvia, “Before we can even wake up into our strength, we are transferred, injured, 
stunted into a new scene we aren’t familiar with. Later we are made objects and priced.” 
(McElroy 1970 231).24 The transfer to an unfamiliar “new scene,” which in turn becomes the 
possibility of life’s objectification and commodification within the capitalistic-scientific complex, 
takes in Women and Men the paranoid form of transfer to a space station where the “stunting” or 
the “injury” is of a more explicitly psycho-sexual nature (very much in tune with Henry Adams’s 
worries), but the “event,” the irretrievable anteriority of which corresponds with the transfer 
from “nature” to “world” and “life” to “existence,” is identical from an ontological perspective. 
 
As we shall see, the “event” of Mayn’s mother’s suicide amounts to a radical confrontation for 
her son with the dissimulating structure of being itself, that is, with the withdrawal of being 
inherent to the presence of being. To employ what are doubtless two of the most prominent 
words in the novel, the mother’s suicide is what provokes the affective encounter with the “gap” 
or the “void” of a difference which divides being, and which in turn is disseminated in the “total 
ecology” of medial discourses that disclose reality as regional or local phenomena: 
anthropological, historical, biological, economic, political, astrophysical, etc., all of which 
preoccupy Mayn in his vocation as an itinerant reporter. Since, as we know, it is less these 
realities themselves, which generally conceal their appearance and remain closed to the question 
of being, which interest McElroy than the gaps between them and the task of uncovering the 
conditions of their appearance, my focus here will be on what is doubtless Mayn’s most 
important encounter with finitude in the novel, his haunted recollection of his mother’s suicide, 
that “event” which, more than any other, determines his way of being in the total ecology as a 
(discontinuous) whole. 
 
Mayn, as the name suggests, is productive of illusion, that kind of illusion which is generated the 
more hyperbolically, it appears, the more exposed its subject is to the gaps in being, the 
temporalisation of which – we saw a brief example of its structure previously – takes on a 
particularly aberrant and destabilizing form in Women and Men. For whereas Cartwright could say: 
“Between this and what happened next, I knew myself to be adequate,” affirming in this manner 
his god-like responsibility for the world in its coming-to-appearance, Mayn, always “in two places 
at once,” is paralyzed by difference and suspended in a present that is split between a “lost 
origin” and the “future” into which the shock of that loss has projected him. This is how he 
explains it in the story he often tells, sometimes to his estranged wife Joy, sometimes to his 
daughter “Flick” (whose given name is Sarah, the name of Mayn’s mother) or to his son Andrew, 
usually over the telephone, which is an important mode of relation, or of “telepathic separation” 
(1051), in the novel: 
                                                     
23 The theme of awakening after a shock to a renewed awareness of reality is constant in McElroy’s work; he 
describes his writing in a radio interview with Michael Silverblatt as “an attempt to respond to the shock of being 
alive with a dissolution of everything that we’ve been prepared to lean on, so that […] we have a model for waking 
up all over again.” (McElroy 2003b). 
24 The theme of the abducted child that fascinates Hind is really, of course, a trope reflecting the irretrievable 
anteriority of Hind’s own “kidnapping” (as the double genitive of the title suggests), that is, the unknowable “event” 
of his own coming into being (having nothing, of course, whatsoever to do with his “biological” birth). 
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Somewhere two people are turned into one; yet witness another One [Mayn himself], lone species 
offspring from these preceding two; and as he, this One, looks back to them, who were not much 
together and preceded each other when departing, he can’t see quite where they went; and, deserted 
by that origin, this One feels thrust from that loss into the future, where he should be glad to be 
because, newsman as he becomes, it’s where tomorrow’s news is; but he isn’t glad, because bringing 
some bits of that aborted origin always along with him jetsam of a mystery far more intelligent than 
he which is partly the Shock of his unhappy mother once upon a time disappearing into the 
elements, he has on just one side of his mind the lone One of himself evolved adrift from that lost 
origin as if to find it in the future where he travels –– 
(whew! a lighter voice exhales returning or retelling the riddle to its subject on another late 
night). (1042, see also page 994) 
 
This is a hyperbolical description of the sense of loss that is doubtless at the basis of all pastoral 
literature, a “loss” that projects itself by a proleptic leap into the future where it assumes the 
figure of what might have been, but is not, triumphal plenitude. Instead, the figure of that 
plenitude, the One, looks back on loss in apocalyptic terms – the outer-space station of colonists 
suggesting, as in Plus, the privation of earth – and encounters itself in the future as the reflected 
image of a primitively desired unity of being, the image, in other words, of what would appear to 
be a secret longing for primordial androgyny. If this compensating figure or fantasy of plenitude, 
this “technological bad joke” as McElroy has himself called it (1987b 162), is ultimately undone 
and the One revealed as multiple, it is only to the extent that the paranoid or catastrophic sense 
of selfhood is suspended, as occurs, we shall see, in Mayn’s haunted daydreams of his mother. 
Yet it is not the proleptic structure of the temporality that is revealed here which is itself aberrant, 
for, as suggested previously, the temporalisation of the gap in being is precisely the means by 
which it can be humanly endured. For this reason, Mayn will never overcome his sense of being 
“in two places at once,” the future and the past, because this divided way of being is, indeed, the 
only way of being in the present: “the Present, which was really the past from the vantage of that 
future he had gone into like a shock of memory which gave off a desire to return to what was a 
void and had to be reinvented, namely this present” (407). Given the “void” in being of which 
the “shock of memory” is the trace – a shock belonging of course to an irretrievable anteriority – 
the present is never, phenomenally-speaking, present. The catastrophic imagination, however, 
transforms this lack of presentness into a vertiginous and mystifying oscillation between the 
future and the past, the two poles that constitute the present, just as the gap or the void of the 
origin is itself conceived in metaphysical terms as a lack of presence, or deprivation of being, 
which in its turn sets in motion the vacillating oppositions between absence and presence, 
emptiness and plenitude, nothingness and being that are suggested in the above quotation; in 
other terms, given Mayn’s curious “embarrassment” regarding his mother’s suicide (639, 799, 
813), which I shall return to in a moment: an oscillation between a certain sense of impropriety, 
on one hand, and propriety, property or appropriation (as the phallic projection of Oneness 
suggests), on the other. Unable to fill the gap at the core of being, the paranoid or catastrophic 
imaginary transforms what might have been a sheltering temporalisation of it into a dizzying 
spiral of oppositions vacillating violently between the two poles, in a gesture which both conceals 
a more authentic relation of the self to its origin, which Mayn will gradually recover, and 
heightens the sense of loss conceived from the proleptic and symptomatic perspective of 
fantasized plenitude. Of course, it is only because he has already to a significant extent worked 
his way back towards that loss that Mayn is able to consider the scene he has “fallen” into (868, 
876, 885) – the futuristic scene of the technical usurpation of gendered psyches – for what it is, a 
paranoid reaction that is typical of Western culture itself, “more fearful and less original than 
dabbling imaginers had already worked out” (1053), which covers a more authentic relation to 
(the gaps in (the total ecology of)) Being. 
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This compensatory reversal of past and future is furthermore incomplete. For if Mayn “isn’t 
glad” about having fallen into the future it is firstly, it appears, not as a result of the inhibiting 
consequences of it, but rather because he is obliged to carry with himself a remainder of the 
“aborted origin,” the “jetsam of a mystery far more intelligent than he”. It is this “jetsam” that he 
must work through, a word of peculiar and powerful affective associations due to his mother 
Sarah’s having presumably drowned herself at sea.  
 
Significantly, Sarah’s death, if I am not mistaken, is never named as such by Mayn in the text, 
unless precisely to suspend belief in it – “the long, days-long moment of his mother’s death, if 
there was one” (656, emphasis in text) –, as if it were not death itself but the impossibility of death 
that her “dying” leaves her son bereaved with: “you might have thought […] Sarah was still 
dying, strangling in waters so deep and cold they preserved you […] from ever putting her out of 
mind” (670, emphasis again in text). Mayn returns obsessively to this event, which of course can 
scarcely be called one, or rather this “event” returns to him, haunting his daydreams in the course 
of the novel. Irreducible, it seems, to death, Mayn’s mother’s “unburiable suicide” (814) is figured 
with a host of euphemisms, or litotes, all suggesting a withdrawal or slipping away from (her 
son’s) life. His “long withdrawn mother” (993), we read, is described as having “vanished into the 
sea” (569), or as having “disappeared” there (442, 443, 872), or as having “absented herself” (404, 
848) or else as “being not present anymore” (639). Figured as “departed” (799, 808), “lost” (798), 
“‘passed away’” (600, 603), his mother’s “sandy, watery leave-taking” (821), is an event that 
curiously embarrasses the son, perhaps, Mayn surmises afterward, because “if you could be 
embarrassed [about a terrible, paining, destroying, living thing like that] maybe that meant his 
mother […] was not dead” (814-15). But also, no less significantly, because such a slipping away 
shames knowledge, consciousness into an awareness of its limits: “it was awful, it was as 
embarrassing as something he might never know” (813). Embarrassment, then, is the sign of 
cognitive authority’s resistance to its own powerlessness, its response to a “catastrophe” (538-9) 
more shocking than negation itself, which Mayn attempts to compensate for, as he discerns, by 
thrusting himself into the future. 
 
The Will to No Power 
 
If the world is the will to power and we ourselves are this will, as 
Nietzsche puts it, what are we to make of the will not to have 
power?  
                                     Joseph McElroy (2003a) 
 
In reaction then to what cannot even be described as a painful experience of loss, Mayn becomes a 
“ghost” to the present (989), the principle effect of which is perhaps the withdrawn form of 
relation, or drawn-out separation, that he repeats with his wife Joy. If this separation ultimately 
proves to be a success, it is above all precisely due to James’s having worked his way back into 
the “mystery” of his withdrawn relation to his mother, rediscovering in the repercussions of the 
shock a more authentic relation to being. Working his way back into her loss, “for which there 
was no word, not even the one they gave it beginning in s” (800), an other mode of separation, 
non-catastrophic or non-paranoid, reveals itself not only as the most viable but also, in a sense, 
the most faithful form of relation in the novel, just as the acceptance of a certain ghostliness is 
revealed as the most authentic way of being in a present that can never, of course, be present. 
 
His recovery then occurs not in the form of any kind of accomplishment, nor even revision, of 
the will to power which underwrites his paranoid flight from finitude, but precisely as an 
interruption, or better suspension, of this flight by what Mayn, back in his formative years, had 
called a “will to no power” (574). McElroy has himself said that the novel is partly about 
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“powerlessness” (McElroy, 1987b 163). As we are now in a position to expect, far from being the 
effect of an ego diminished by the domination of technology as the accomplishment of 
modernity’s will to power (Mailer’s nightmare), this powerlessness might be qualified, borrowing 
Harry Mathews’ phrase, as an “inspired acceptance” of finitude (Mathews 225),25 a radical 
acceptance of a slipping away or of a withdrawal which, as we’ve seen, is irreducible to death as 
the simple negation of life. 
 
The enigma of this acceptance is the central enigma of Women and Men. For how is one to 
conceive of the acceptance of such a passivity, as one might call it, a passivity which offers no 
hold even for the slightest prerogative, the slightest intention? How can such powerlessness 
constitute a manner of being? Rather than attempt to respond directly to these questions, it is 
necessary to consider in more detail the slipping away or the withdrawal from presence that Mayn 
encounters, reencounters in his daydreams of his departed mother. For if this encounter, to the 
extent of course that it can be called one, is an encounter with finitude, with the gap or the void 
in being that Mayn never ceases dwelling upon – “the gap of his mother” (901); “this gap a part 
of you was always passing through” (903); “a gap he saw back into that was his own ongoing 
mystery” (907), etc. –, this finitude is expressed as a voice, a voice which emerges precisely as a 
resonance or an acoustic effect of the void: “[his mother] then, as a future absence, brought 
herself close inside her offspring, furnishing a gap where […] her voice would sometimes 
resume” (197). More generally, finitude is expressed as the material and tropological resonance of 
the gap, as is suggested by the insistent manner by which the mother’s presence is identified 
throughout the novel as a sort of acoustic auto-affection of the void – as both her melancholy 
and her violin-playing suggest26 – and by the even more insistent manner by which she is 
associated with turns and curves and bends which are themselves the figures of (the gap in) being as 
a tropological phenomenon. Of the human, if one prefers, as a tropological animal – and 
“producer” thereby (although this production is irreducible to any faculty of the subject) of the 
eidetic phenomenon we call reality. Mayn, that “man of many turns, an itinerant chronicler” 
(894), that is, a man of language, a writer, however modestly, works his way back to the rhetorical 
conditions of being through his paradoxical relation to his mother, by recalling, for instance, “the 
curve of her slow sweep through the rooms of the house” (583), “the curve of the small of her 
back” (590), or “the wind his poor mother carved […] curved by whim of some swerved splinter 
in the groove of her unwed brain” (669), to offer just a few examples of the curves with which the 
mother is physically, corporally associated throughout the text, as though her memory in her 
son’s mind were an embodiment of language in its originary, tropological function. 
 
                                                     
25 Yves Abrioux writes that “Women and Men voices an […] uncertain acceptance of the cognitive breakdown which 
accompanies an event that registers predominantly in terms of affect.” (2001 49). This is an admirably concise 
formulation of what is perhaps the novel’s basic poetic principle, and a formulation which only apparently 
contradicts Harry Mathews’ more affirmative assertion of “inspired acceptance,” for Abrioux goes on to show how 
the cognitive breakdown in question is the condition of what he calls the “non-organic bodily functions” that 
contribute to the novel’s “particular narrative impulse” (analysed in a fragment from the novel’s opening chapter 
dealing with the “event” not of death, which I am focusing on here, but of birth). The difference between the two 
formulations, between an “inspired” and an “uncertain” acceptance, points rather to a fundamental ambiguity in the 
suspension of cognitive power that is central to McElroy’s writing. 
26 For example: “he […] wanted to hear the interruption no the interrupted phrases of her violining cross slowly, 
back-tracking in order to go ahead, halting upon a gap, her whole self or life, or just music, get it right, go back, go 
back, go back again and get it right” (392). I should point out that Julia Brooks, David Brooks’ mother in A 
Smugglers’ Bible is a violinist too, and, like Sarah Mayn, is preoccupied with death, as is evident in chapter three of the 
novel where she spends her day haunted by the image of a dead girl she discovers in a tabloid. The violin is 
associated with the mother as an acoustic – and properly speaking pre-figural presence – as is suggested by Mayn’s 
allusion to his mother’s “musick womb” (601), a subject I shall return to further on. McElroy’s own mother, 
apparently, was a violinist (McElroy, 1990 27), as is the mother in The Letter Left to Me (1988). 
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If these visions or hallucinations, recollected in the body of the text, are uncanny, or better 
unheimlich, it is precisely because they uncover what normally is covered or concealed,27 nothing 
less than those “untouchable processes beneath appearance,” as McElroy calls them, which are 
grounded in the tropological properties of language, in what de Man calls the “rhetoricity” of 
language, emphasizing with this neologism the irreducibility of the rhetorical properties of 
language to the classical conception of tropes as merely imitative or secondary with respect to 
supposedly proper meanings (de Man, 1979 175). If these daydreams are emotionally powerful, it 
is because they paradoxically touch not the affective source of existence – there is no affection 
prior to existence –, but the source of affective life in the dissimulating structure of existence 
itself: in short, the presentation of life as a retreat of life. Such is the “mystery” of the “origin” 
that Mayn works his way back into, uncovering in the haunted reveries of his mother’s 
tropological withdrawal from being – “his day-dreams of a near-naked mother (never turning 
around yet turning and turning and turning in the sea like just a body)” (645) – nothing less than 
the source of his own existence. I shall offer a more detailed reading of one such reverie further 
on. 
 
Being-in-the-World 
 
and if the gap or void was different from him, it still gave off a 
scent of almond, nature’s unsalted, unskinned almond, sweet wood 
(1031) 
 
The enigma of an inspired or uncertain acceptance of finitude is also then an encounter with the 
tropological character of language which is covered in the utilitarian and instrumentalist 
conception of it on which techno-scientific and capitalist modes of production depend. If this 
encounter enables Mayn to overcome his eco-sexual-catastrophic imaginary, one should not be 
surprised that he is never more than “half-convinced” of its paranoid nature (1053). That he 
remains only half-convinced attests to the fact that no cognition of the tropological materiality of 
language is possible. Only a certain hauntedness testifies to the “presence” of it. Mayn’s 
hauntedness is an ampler, slower, more meditative version of the “god-like” awareness – 
corresponding, one will recall, with a loss of cognitive power – attained by Cartwright in Lookout 
Cartridge. If “the world is the will to power and we are this will,” the “will not to have power,” in 
suspending who we are, cannot possess the power or the authority of a conviction. 
 
Yet nor can this will to no power be negated. Not even the infinite negation of science – an 
infinitization increasing exponentially at both micro and macroscopic levels (or sub-micro and 
super-macro, etc. ad infinitum) can negate it,28 which is why Mayn, projected into the remotest 
outpost of being in man’s techno-scientific flight from finitude, remains haunted by the figure of 
his mother’s departure. The dissimulating structure of being eludes reduction to the dialectical 
oppositions of being and nothingness, plenitude and lack, and of future and past as a synthetizing 
totality in which the present could finally be lived as fully present. Will to power and the 
enigmatic will to no power, infinite production as the astro-geo-bio-physico-mathematical 
                                                     
27 This, of course, is precisely the definition that Schelling gives to the unheimlich, which Freud borrows: “everything 
is unheimlich which ought to have remained secret and hidden but which is unconcealed.” (Freud 200) 
28 Infinite negation which is also, needless to say, infinite production, as is suggested on numerous occasions in the 
text with respect to the futuristic colony in outer-space that Mayn fears he has come from; here is one comic 
example: “and the colonists will be doing their future farming under ideal conditions getting eight hundred and fifty 
pounds of grain per acre per day just like the desert greenhouses on the southeast shore of the Persian Gulf speed-
picking tons of potatoes grown with unsupported roots – vegetables prospering on Styrofoam boards and spin-off 
colors spraying the roots that hang down below. We’re maximizing milk production using tomato-vine-fed goats that 
weigh a tenth of what a cow weighs but give a quarter as much milk which will be all the sweeter if you keep the 
billies back on Earth and inseminate by space shuttle.” (420) 
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exploitation of “nature” (the universe) and the finite production of eidetic realities which haunt 
the catastrophic, paranoid infinitisation of finitude, these are the two poles, non-dialectical, and 
therefore in constant disharmony with each other, that constitute the narrative dynamic of Women 
and Men. They determine, among other things, the multiplicity of strange, uncanny doublings and 
resemblances that occur in the novel – including Mayn’s (perhaps sibling) rivalry with the sinister 
Ray Spence (echoing that of Cartwright and the terrorist Len Incremona in Lookout Cartridge) –, a 
discussion of which would unfortunately lead beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Here we must consider how Mayn’s hauntedness is the condition, or in-condition rather, of a 
recovered sense of being-in-the-world. This may seem paradoxical. Working back against his 
sense “that a world for which the word world was wrong was happening to him” (1053) – back 
against that “world” which, as McElroy suggests, “is” the will to power – what is restored is not 
the world in some more positive, concrete or objective sense than previously, but the world as 
appearance. Such an awakening, or re-awakening, to the enigma of appearance is precisely what is 
occurring in Mayn’s hallucinatory daydreams of his mother. What he is awakening to, in other 
words, is the difference between nature “itself” and nature as an eidetic reality, or, as we read, 
between the “organic natural” and “the human brain’s troposphere of endless economixes” 
(881). As in Lookout Cartridge where the hero becomes aware that the world is not “separate” 
from him and that his “god-like” manner of being involves an exorbitant responsibility for the 
coming-into-being of appearance, Mayn, working his way back from his catastrophic 
worldlessness, recovers a productive or a performative manner of “seeing” which, in a certain 
manner, retrieves being: “And so he would try to get away from that distant future through 
which he fell, by seeing such other times as perhaps had not been altogether lost and seeing them 
so well that they came back into being” (1053). 
 
A reading in its entirety of the long sentence from which this fragment is taken would enable us 
to recognize that being-in-the-world in this sense involves, along with the productive or 
performative mode of “seeing” that is evoked here, both personal and political responsibilities 
that Mayn’s paranoia had caused him to ignore. But the productive or performative nature of this 
seeing – “seeing such other times as perhaps had not been altogether lost and seeing them so well 
that they came back into being” – is vital. It is also the essence of what I’ve taken the risk of 
calling the pastoral ethos that is apparent in much of McElroy’s work. This attention to reality 
not as an object but as appearance which appears precisely as an attribute, not of a subject, of 
course, but of a retrieving mode of consciousness which, moreover, is conscious of its 
responsibility for retrieval – however hyperbolical, or indeed, impossible this responsibility is 
from the point of view of the subject – is pervasive in McElroy’s writing. This responsibility is 
impossible, yet the world would not exist were it not for the existence of Ma(y)n, not, once again, 
as a Subject, but as the singular being (Dasein) whose existence or exposure to finitude constitutes 
the “site” or “position” of eidetic production in the impersonal “field” of language.29 
 
Mayn’s becomes haunted then by the awareness of an impossible responsibility for being, that is, 
by the uncanny awareness of the figuring or eidetic properties of speech. His quest for retrieval 
(which is also that of the author, who shares the same initials as his protagonist) is founded on 
the basic ontological truth that nothing is lost that language, in the idealities or unreal formalities 
enclosed in its materiality, can speak. Yet, as the other side of this same truth, everything is lost, 
with the advent of language that separates being from itself, and which, however, differs that 
                                                     
29 This is an allusion to William Wilson’s important essay on McElroy, “Fathoming the Field.” If Wilson’s 
conception of being “fielded” seems not incompatible with Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world,” as I 
suggested earlier, we might also interpret Mayn’s paranoid projection of himself into the future and his consequent 
sense of worldlessness as a case of “unfielding” himself: “unfielding oneself is the offense for which fieldlessness is 
the punishment” (Wilson 2012). 
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loss.30 In other words, the essential finitude of being is given before the world itself appears as 
the retrieval of being, a retrieval which is finally based not on nostalgia at all perhaps but on a 
deeper, more radical, orphic claim to reality. Loss, of course, is the condition of retrieval, but 
unlike the nostalgic longing for presence, conceived as absent, which thereby veils from itself the 
essential finitude of being, the mode of retrieval that determines Mayn’s being-in-the-world is a 
productive mode which depends precisely on an intense awareness of finitude, and is strangely, 
stubbornly reluctant to suppress it. That is why “the slow or endless poetry of being aware, of 
being conscious,” as McElroy writes in a mordant and penetrating remark about the human 
condition that hasn’t the slightest trace of sarcasm, can “mak[e] the life of awareness seem like a 
slow suicide.” (457) The life of awareness can seem like a slow suicide because finitude, mortality 
has been accepted, and in that sense given to oneself, from the beginning, yet differed. And that 
differed acceptance, which at its limit is an utter paradox, a masking of what has always already 
been unmasked, and hence a knowledge or an awareness concealed from itself, is the precise 
inversion of the catastrophic imaginary and its temporal hysteria that we saw previously. This 
type of awareness gives poignant and specific meaning to the enigmatic Latin phrase: Et in 
Arcadia Ego (I, too, lived in Arcadia; even in Arcadia there is death) that was sometimes found as 
an inscription on tombs in pastoral landscapes of the Renaissance painters, for it comprehends 
death not as an empirical given but as the transcendental condition, or in-condition, of the life we 
humans live on earth. Such an awareness is perhaps what the pastoral tradition has always sought 
to teach, and it is this awareness which is the possibility of Mayn’s recovered sense of being-in-
the-world. This awareness is impossible in essence, that is, essentially veiled from itself, and yet it 
is able to account for itself and for being in its finitude, as for example when Mayn observes, 
admirably: “and if the gap or void was different from him, it still gave off a scent of almond, 
nature’s unsalted, unskinned almond, sweet wood” (1031). Reality, nature presents itself not in 
itself but precisely as a mode of appearance mediated by an unknowable void in being and by the 
idealities or unreal formalities of speech in its vernacular materiality – “almond,” “unsalted,” 
“unskinned,” “wood,” “sweet,” etc. – whether transcribed or not by what McElroy calls (without 
being in the least bit “poetical”) “the poetry of being aware, of being conscious.” Using a 
botanical term, as seems appropriate here, we can say that there is a fundamental “dehiscence” in 
being, that is, in the almond, whose perceivable presence, even purified or distilled to the sensible 
apprehension of its “scent” (one of the least mediated of sense perceptions), is an effect of 
language. I am calling “pastoral” awareness this awareness of nature as a rhetorical “gap or void” 
in being, or better perhaps, this awareness of the retrieval of nature in its unreality or ideality 
from the abyss of being, and which furthermore is aware of itself as such. 
 
One understands now why death is such an important figure in Women and Men, notably with 
respect to Mayn’s recovery. Death, not of the self, but of the other, is the ultimate figure of the 
retreat from presence that being supposes, the ultimate figure of finitude which, as we have seen, 
is given in being’s dissimulation, not its negation. Death itself is not the negation of life in 
McElroy’s novel – we never learn if Mayn’s mother really died or not – but the ultimate figure of 
its withdrawal in its very donation.31 
 
It is only because of this radical awareness of death, not, once again, as an empirical reality but as 
the transcendental in-condition of the “life” we humans live, and because of the ability to 
withstand the unheimlich effects of its figuration, to which we must now return, that the writer – 
                                                     
30 By “language” I mean in general the sign, the trace, the mark whose identity discloses “things” in distinguishing 
itself from them, if only by its very repeatability or iterability, which is already, of course, to say its ideality (see 
Derrida, 1990 105). 
31 Death as unknowable in itself and therefore only as figure is a frequent topos in the writing of Paul de Man; it is 
commented on at length by Derrida in Mémoires pour Paul de Man, which is also itself a meditation on the tropological 
and its relation to death, loss and memory. See notably “L’art des mémoires” (Derrida, 1988 59-94). 
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Mayn the itinerant chronicler – can reclaim a relation to being that modern science and 
technology have taught us to ignore. No doubt nature presents itself “poetically” first – before 
becoming the “object” of infinite research and the “harnessing” of “its” energy –, that is, in its 
figural or eidetic difference from itself. But the possibility of Mayn’s slow, indeed unending, 
awakening to that truth is the uncanny returning of the apparition of his mother. 
 
Ghostly Difference 
 
Let me turn now to two of the most enigmatic occurrences of this return as it suspends, as I’ve 
suggested, the paranoid or catastrophic imaginary. While the innumerable allusions to curves, 
bends, turns, spirals, corners, etc., in Mayn’s haunted reveries of his “departed” mother all bring 
to appearance, as we saw, the tropological character of being’s essentially dissimulating structure, 
nowhere is this structure figured, in the visual sense of the term, in such an unheimlich manner as 
in the visions of Sarah’s nocturnal apparition as it will have occurred, James recalls, in his 
adolescence. 
 
For Mayn’s traumatism is, in fact, double: the first “shock” being that of an awakening to sexual 
difference though the discovery – of which he grows conscious as he works back through the 
“jetsam” of his origin – of his mother’s adultery, probably responsible for the birth of his 
younger brother Brad; and the second, as we’ve seen, that of her “departure,” which itself, it is 
surmised, may be the result of an attempt to avoid a second illegitimate pregnancy.  
 
Mayn’s projection of himself into the futuristic nightmare therefore has a double origin, and it is 
precisely the double character of this trauma which, ultimately, will have a curative effect: the 
mother’s ghost-like apparition after the first shock preparing the groundwork, as it were, for the 
son’s recovery from the second. One day on the beach at the age of thirteen Mayn receives the 
first shock which, thirty-some years later, he will know as being partly responsible not only for a 
certain “turning” away from his mother – in the attempt, precisely, to see the source of that 
shock – but for the paranoid “warping” of himself into his futuristic ordeal: 
 
he knew […] that at thirteen he had missed some point before when he turned away from her to 
see what the heck she was looking at so he warped her and himself into a real fix he would never 
get out of, oh it was his future he’d have to go to and look back from (394). 
 
He is too late, of course, to see what his mother’s gaze reflects to him: her lover, Bob Yard, on 
the beach. But in memory Mayn returns repeatedly to the shock his awareness received at that 
instant, a shock which provokes, as we observe here, an avid desire to know its origin: whence 
the initial turn (“he turned away from her”), followed by the “warping” of that turn into the 
future which he will spend the rest of his life looking back from. 
 
If Mayn is “divided into two,” as we read further on (and as I pointed out previously), by that 
shock and its immediate after-effects, it is not by the vision of any “primal scene” but instead by 
the act of his mother’s appearing to divert his attention, turning her gaze to sea; the way in which 
Mayn interprets this “dissimulation” will have important consequences: 
 
if he had only been smart enough to see that it had been her life she had somehow lost and not a 
son whom she divided into two that they [her lover and her son] not meet (403). 
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This is one of many suggestions in the text that not the least important effect of Mayn’s shock 
was to cause him to turn away – into the solipsistic outer-space vacuum of the ego32 – from the 
suffering of others, his mother’s first if not foremost. But no evidence of a primal scene, rather 
the appearance of its veiling, of its dissimulation, is what divides Mayn, as he gathers thirty-some 
years later, “warping” him into the future and causing him to turn away from the “life” his mother 
is losing or has already “lost.” The turning of his mother’s face towards the sea where, indeed, it 
appears her life will be lost is the first “turn” in what will become a vertiginous series of turns – 
the basis of the aberrant and destabilizing temporality of the sexually catastrophic imaginary –, 
the acceleration of which proceeds from the son’s desire to look back into what the first turn 
would be diverting him from seeing. The paranoid imaginary begins there, not simply in a 
misinterpreted act of dissimulation, but in the reductive interpretation of a turning towards death 
as a mere turning away from presence – call it symbolically the phallus – that the son wishes 
revealed. 
 
This phallocentric “warping” of an originary turning is what Mayn, we know, will have to work 
back from. What has not yet been interrogated directly however is the way in which by 
uncovering, not presence, but the tropological conditions of being which the quest for presence 
conceals, it is the very structure of Western power relations, fundamentally paranoid in nature, 
that is dismantled, or, if I dare say, deconstructed. This deconstruction of course leaves nothing 
of the phallocentric basis of these power relations intact. If sexual difference, as I pointed out 
earlier, is silenced in speech but returns in the writing of Women and Men (not Men and Women, as 
in conventional usage), this is because in working his way back to the shock of his mother’s 
adultery – itself, of course, a turning away from paternal law – Mayn turns or rather returns his 
attention to the rhetoricity of that shock, to the tropological character of being itself, and it is no 
accident of course that the source of this “revelation” is maternal. Indeed, the non-dialectical, 
disharmonious opposition that structures the text between empowering modes of cognition 
which efface difference, or finitude, on one hand, and the “will to no power” which recovers that 
difference, on the other, is itself determined, in Oedipal fashion, in terms of parental 
identification. Much as sexual difference is “covered” in the voicing of the maternal name 
(Mayne), but uncovered and expressed in its writing, technology, and the modern regime of 
representation which corresponds with it, covers an older comprehension of the “coupling” of 
technè and phusis, an older, less paranoid, understanding of the relation between technology and 
nature. The “root conflict” or the philosophical antithesis which informs and (de-)structures 
Women and Men is partly determined, in other words, by paternal identification and separation 
from the mother. But it is also determined, or rather problematized in a radical manner, as we’ve 
seen, by a relation to the (separation from the) mother, that is, by a paradoxical identification with 
the maternal origin of the self. I call this identification paradoxical because, as Freud claims at 
least, individuation occurs precisely as a separation from the mother and an identification with 
the figure of the father. Indeed, only the father, in this Oedipal logic, assumes the status of figure, 
the affective bond or attachment to the mother consisting, on the contrary, of a pre-figural 
(monstrous, Medusa-like) threat to identification and to the process of individuation.33 
 
                                                     
32 To borrow an elegant formulation from Jonathan Lethem who writes, speaking of the Mailer/McElroy opposition 
in Ancient History: “One Brooklyn boy calling to another to reconsider his ‘Manichean’ […] exaggerations in favour 
of a view more grounded in awareness of bodies in time, bodies in their places, in rooms and streets and in nature, 
and most of all as bodies in relation to others rather than existing in solipsistic outer-space vacuums of ego” (Lethem 
xi). See the two essays by Abrioux in the bibliography to further pursue the question raised here of the body in 
McElroy’s work. 
33 For my understanding of a paradoxical maternal identification, I am indebted to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of Freud in “Le Peuple juif ne rêve pas” (1981). In his discussion of the “figural poetics” 
of Plus, Yves Abrioux also links the figural to the problematic of identification (2011 166-169). 
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That is why it is inevitable, perhaps, insofar as the mother’s presence does not manifest itself in 
strictly acoustic terms (her voice and her violin, as we saw previously), that her figure return in a 
ghostly manner. A manner which suspends, in its very withdrawal from presence, the 
phallocentric or paternal logic of identification.34 That the nightmare, our nightmare of 
technological power and paranoia is itself suspended by this return is due to the fact that the 
paternal logic of identification and the regime of representation that underwrites it – that regime 
which, once again, subordinates appearance to presence, or the structure of dissimulation to the 
dialectical logic of absence and presence – is the condition of the “objectivity” of science, of the 
modern techno-scientific quest for a Mathesis universalis capable of “mapping” nature with no 
remainder.35 Just as the reductive translation (and interpretation) of mimèsis as “imitation,” or as 
the mere re-presentation of given phenomena, involves a shift, as we saw earlier, from the 
cognitively “powerless” state of being “in between” to the cognitively “powerful” (but ruinous 
and disabling) status of a subject in a world of objects, a world of “whatness,” so the 
understanding of technè as technology involves a shift from a certain kind of “knowledge” to 
“power,” as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has suggested (2012 117):36 a power of which the 
instrumentalization of language as self-expression is scarcely a mere example, given what we’ve 
seen about the “poetic” character of being-in-the-world, as Heidegger insisted. 
 
What Mayn retrieves, then, working back into the “jetsam of a mystery far more intelligent than 
he” – nothing less, of course, than a “remainder” of the techno-scientific quest for transparency 
noted above – is indeed an “older” comprehension of the “coupling” of technè and phusis, one 
which modern technology and its will to power conceals. He works his way back into a 
“knowledge,” in Lacoue-Labarthe’s sense of the term – which from a more general perspective 
doubtless underwrites the “un-reified” relations between women and men in McElroy’s novel –, 
or into an awareness that I related to the pastoral tradition, however far that tradition may seem, 
wrongly perhaps, from the “knowledge” (technè) of the Greeks. 
 
Here then is the first apparition of the enigmatic figure of Mayn’s mother, which occurs before 
her “departure” but after the shock her son receives of her (transgressive) sexuality (let me add 
that, given the ghostly return of this figure turning on a staircase, and its importance for Mayn, I 
cannot help thinking that McElroy had Henry James, that Master of dissimulation, in mind when 
he named his character James); it begins with the presentation of the hyperbolical sense of 
temporal disjunction, quoted partially above, which is compared to, but also interrupted by, the 
apparition of James’s mother: 
 
The future [he] had sloped out onto was like us the slope, static but for the shadow it 
threw, which was him, back upon Now, the Present, which was really the past from the vantage of 
that future he had gone into like a shock of memory which gave off a desire to return to what was a 
void and had to be reinvented, namely this present: God! It wasn’t him, this future position, it felt 
causeless, caused by an absence of cause, it came at him a sure home, not someone else’s. 
 
                                                     
34 That the history of metaphysics since Plato is determined phallocentrically, as Derrida has shown, is also insisted 
on by Granel in his essay “Phedon, le matin,” where he writes, in a manner that may help clarify the link between the 
sexual, the proper and Western power at its origin that is in question here: “Plato’s sexual reveals in fact not the 
sexual, but a certain logic (of the) sexual: that of the phallic obsession with property.” (1995 166, my translation). 
35 On Mathesis universalis as the Western techno-scientific drive to total transparency see Granel (2012 51-105). 
36 See Lacoue-Labarthe’s terse and provocative reading of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, where he writes: “The response 
to the vertigo of technè is technical agitation. […] Therein, precisely, is the lure par excellence, namely the Western lure 
itself – that is, as long as the West […] is understood as that which will have always shrunk from the dread of 
knowledge (another word to translate, in its full meaning, the Greek technè) by taking refuge in know-how [savoir-
faire], and as that which will have always confused ability (the gift) with power.” (2012 117) 
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Like when he woke up one night, and it was the night he walked out on the landing to find 
Sarah his mother wending her way upstairs with a book – and come to think of it her 
grandmother’s large comb – in her hand, reading. And a flashlight made like a candle. 
But when he woke at first he heard certainly his mother, her neutral though now unusually 
explaining voice […] and something else […] caught Jim but he didn’t catch, for what was it?, he 
only got out of bed. […] Turning to look down the stairs, he saw his mother on the way up with a 
book and comb, reading – the big brown-and-black-and-golden-orange comb. But later on he 
thought it might have been her ghost, and he could allow the possibility of ghosts […]. (407-08) 
 
It goes without saying that the few remarks I can make here are too brief to be decisive. It 
appears evident, however, that causeless, or “caused by an absence of cause,” the proleptic leap 
into the future and the maternal apparition which suspends it emerge from the same unreachable 
anteriority of the “void” in being, as I pointed out previously. But the hyperbolical 
temporalisation of the void is stilled in the ghost-like apparition of the mother. Simply put: after 
the traumatic awakening to sexual identity, that is, to difference, which is the “absent” cause of 
the temporal reversals and delirium, Mayn’s mother appears as a figural presentation – or visitation 
– of difference itself, the calm neutrality of which has the effect of suspending the phallocentric 
panic: the acoustic presence of the voice which precedes the spectral visitation itself, her 
“wending” up the stairs as her son is “turning” to look down them, not to mention the book in 
her hand, read by flashlight, all point to the material and tropological (or meta-tropological) 
figuring of the void discussed previously.  
 
Of course, the essential ambiguity of the figure resides in the fact that, withdrawing as a presence 
in its very presentation, abyssal in its ghostliness,37 it calms the son’s exposure to difference, to 
finitude. That is why, having appeared in life as a ghost, Mayn hopes she will re-appear after her 
“departure,” that is, after the second shock or traumatism: 
 
So later, after she had gone down the drain of the sea you might say cruelly, he looked forward to 
seeing her ghost again, because this other night when she was alive and Jim could have sworn had 
been heard just outside in the hall […] she had evidently been a ghost out of the future. Of course 
as well as what she was. (409) 
 
In short, the sexual trauma, followed by the ghostly apparition which suspends certain 
nightmarish effects of it, sets the stage, as I suggested previously, for its return after the second 
trauma, that of his mother’s having “gone down the drain of the sea,” as Mayn puts it, as always 
haunted by the tropological imagery that is almost invariably associated with her loss. I shall not 
discuss here the reasons why Mayn should have to wait thirty-some years for his haunted 
daydreams to have the effects I discussed above, nor the fundamental question, from a 
psychoanalytical perspective, of the “lateness” of his recovery. As Mayn himself observes: “What 
happens is never what comes first” (994). I shall simply point out in phenomenological terms 
that since the “object” has always already appeared in its “whatness,” and how it appeared isn’t 
anywhere in the appeared, the “untouchable processes beneath appearance,” as McElroy, once 
again, puts it, can only be thought outside the object itself, not in what “comes first” but 
afterwards. This is a logic of which Mayn’s mother herself seems aware in her frequent allusions 
to Einstein’s theory of curved space – an important homology or trope in the text –, which leaves 
Euclid’s notion of linear space phenomenally intact even while completely invalidating it. In the 
                                                     
37 It is this withdrawal from presence which determines, of course, the opening of the “subject” to a plural identity – 
“Multiplied now into a life he [Mayn] could not explain to Joy.” (1052) – that Harry Mathews is right to insist on. Let 
me also note here, being unable to develop this point further, that the kind of paradoxical identification with the 
retreat of identification that we observe in Mayn’s relation to his mother should lead, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 
suggest, to a rethinking of the unconscious beyond the psychological; perhaps the “colloidal unconscious” developed 
in Women and Men.  
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same way, an awareness of “what happens,” that is, an awareness of the tropological and 
productive functions of language – “It is thinking him!” exclaims Mayn (994), echoing the 
narrative voice’s much earlier “We are spoken” (56) – undermines its grammatical and cognitive 
functions even as it leaves empirical consciousness of phenomenal reference intact. Lateness is a 
consequence of the disjunction between our everyday conception of language as descriptive or 
constative and the more originary, tropological and performative structure of language.38 
 
Here is the second visitation, or, as Mayn puts it, the second “reinvention” of his mother’s 
apparition. The figure possesses the same calm serenity, as though hovering between life and 
death, or beyond such oppositions, and with the same “protective” gaze as she turns away from 
the book she is reading, which is not Henry James’s “The Turn of the Screw,” of which this 
scenario might be considered a sort of an anti-hysterical revision, but a novel by Hawthorne. 
More explicitly than in the previous version of the day-dream, the visitation occurs as the 
suspension or caesura of the terrifying synthesizing power of the techno-scientific future: 
 
Yet no power from the next century’s L5 libration settlements to imagine into life the mid-
twentieth century (hardly the first to see itself the last) can deny to Jim […] a lost dream such as 
Jim’s one rainy night when he woke and exited from his bed sweating to open his door and saw his 
mother in her nightgown of course heading downstairs so slowly she seemed sleepwalking until she 
turned to look back up at him, her hair across one side of her face and he saw she was 
“readwalking” – a book in her hand, no common word of “It’s late” in her eyes that seemed 
protective for a change but he didn’t know of what – and he asked her what it was, and didn’t mean 
to though the act produced an effect, which was that as she told him he forgot his lost nightmare: 
“The Marble Faun,” she said, “and I’ve almost put my eyes out staying up reading – and what have 
you been up to, my darling?” 
He didn’t know, and could only say, “What are you doing?” to which she softly replied as if 
her heart were in it, turning away and proceeding downstairs, “Just reading.” But he remembered 
going back to bed and later starting up awake convinced he was plunged into a future where people 
had been at once combined and sent away to settle another world. (666-67) 
 
Two remarks to conclude. Firstly, the “protective” gaze of this figure of a serene and melancholic 
dignity, dissimulating in its essence, but beyond all power of simulation, is the in-condition, for 
beyond being itself, of the pastoral ethos I’ve attempted to define with respect to McElroy’s 
writing. In one of Henry James’s most enigmatic works, a short story entitled (in its initial 
publication) “The Way it Came,” a similar apparition comes as an admonitory figure, warning 
against the specular and dialectical appropriation of difference (and thereby preserving the 
possibility of a different form of relation). One of Maurice Blanchot’s narrators, who, like 
McElroy perhaps, also finds himself confronted with a repetition or a revision of an apparition 
from James – a “sovereign apparition,” he writes, whose “return” suspends the narrative and 
exposes its narrator to the outside, to pure difference – qualifies it as “apocalyptic,” while 
insisting, however, on the turning and on the dissimulating appearance of the figure, feminine in 
this case too: “a little turned aside, the body half-bent, the head inclined towards the knees,” 
“slightly distanced from herself amidst her presence,” etc. (Blanchot 134-166, my translation), 
which saves or protects. 
 
These are figures of Revelation, as the book in Mayn’s mother’s hand suggests, but of a literary 
and secular nature, grounded in the vernacular language of speech. What they reveal, in their 
abyssal manner, is nothing less than the enigma of appearance itself, the “mystery” of an 
irreducibly figural dimension of being. Its rhetorical or tropological “in-condition,” if this term 
                                                     
38 One supposes from the title of the novel McElroy has been working on apparently for a number of years, Voir 
Dire (McElroy, 2001 15), meaning, literally, seeing saying, that it will also explore these performative and tropological 
conditions of appearance. 
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can suffice to describe a condition that slips away in its very conditionality. What the pastoral 
ethos in McElroy’s work comes down to, in the end, is a stance of respect towards appearance, 
towards the figurality of the world or of reality, as the fundamental condition for saving it. 
 
This includes – and this is my second remark, merely a reemphasis of the first – the appearance 
of ghosts,39 that is, the apprehension (no perception, we saw in the first extract, can quite “catch” 
it) of an unheimlich figuring of the gap in being which discloses finitude and conceals it at the same 
time. Gives it in withholding it. Beyond any “natural” or “biological” maternity, since it is the 
figure of a mother we have been dealing with,40 the revelation of this giving (and the giving of 
this revelation) is the enigma at the source of all “human” relations, as McElroy, in his book, has 
given us in his turn to read: “we, who are relations meteorolong, whorled, humanward” (657). 
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